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I

n this article, we examine the impact of repeat interactions between VCs and underwriters. Past research
has suggested that such interactions build trust and
may contribute to more equitable treatment of issuing
firms. We adopt an alternative perspective and suggest that
these repeat interactions are characterized by reciprocal exchanges facilitated by opportunistic behavior from the VC.
Our analysis demonstrates that VCs and underwriters interact in order to appropriate greater value from the IPO. This
article provides a more complete understanding of repeat interactions between the VC and the underwriter by identifying
characteristics of the relationship that have an impact on the
value of the IPO.
Keywords: repeat interactions, IPO, reciprocal
exchanges, VC
Venture backing provides important resources for
entrepreneurs as they progress through the stages of
new venture startup (Jindra & Leshchinskii, 2015). In
addition to financing, VC firms provide managerial
expertise and guidance that has been shown to enhance start-up success (Jindra & Leshchinskii, 2015).
Highly reputable VCs have been shown to be more
successful in leading firms to an initial public offering (IPO) (Nahata, 2008). It is no surprise, then, that
VC firms have a large presence in the IPO market.
Nearly 40 percent of IPOs were venture backed over
the time period 1994–2007. Despite the obvious
benefits associated with venture backing, evidence
has shown that venture-backed IPOs experience
greater underpricing than non-venture backed IPOs
(Lee & Wahal, 2004). Underpricing refers to the difference between the price at which shares are sold
pre-IPO and the price at which the shares trade once
issued to the market.
We adopt an agency perspective to explain the
presence of reciprocal exchanges between underwriters and VCs. We suggest that top VCs establish
reciprocal exchanges with underwriters as a way to
gain more immediate access to investment gains
through shorter lockup periods. VCs maintain portfolio firms that are growing toward a potential IPO.
In order to appropriate the most value from an IPO
event, VCs seek to issue shares at a high price with
minimal underpricing. Such an approach benefits
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015

both the entrepreneur and the VC: the entrepreneur
because less money is left on the table, and the VC
because they receive a higher return from their investment.
Top venture capitalists act, in a way, as gatekeepers
of an underwriter’s involvement in future IPOs. The
influence that venture capitalists have on portfolio
firms heavily impacts which underwriters are invited to
participate. Following this logic, if an IPO is substantially underpriced, VCs are positioned to punish the
underwriter by excluding them from future business
with their IPO firms (Bradley, Kim, & Krigman,
2015). Despite this position to enact retributive justice,
examinations show that VC firms do not actually punish underwriters for high underpricing. In fact, evidence shows that underwriters that engage in underpricing actually gain more access to IPO firms not less
(Ritter & Welch, 2002). We attempt to explain why
such relationships persist and to examine the possible
implications for the entrepreneur.
Previous research has provided several explanations for underpricing, including, the belief that VCs
agree to underpricing as payment for all-star analyst
coverage (Bradley et al., 2015, 2011; Liu, Arthurs,
Nam, & Mousa, 2013), that underpricing is the result
of asymmetric information (Jenkinson & Jones,
2009), that it is a signal of issuing firm quality
(Kennedy, Sivakumar, & Vetzal, 2006), a mechanism
to intensify price momentum so that VCs can cash
out at a higher price (Bradley et al., 2015), or that VC
grandstanding encourages greater underpricing (Lee
& Wahal, 2004). These positions do not fully explain
why top VCs, which are capable of negotiating a successful public offering without relying heavily on underwriters, are willing to accept such high levels of
underpricing.
In this article, we focus on repeat exchanges to
explain the prevalence of underpricing of IPO firms.
We suggest that VCs and underwriters engage in reciprocal exchanges, which present immediate benefits
to both the VC and the underwriter, create greater
trust, and contribute to the formation of long-term
relationships. Additionally, we argue that when there
is an established history between the VC and underwriter, and VCs act in their own self-interest the exWHAT’S IN IT FOR ME? 11
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changes become more costly to the entrepreneurial
firm when the proceeds from the IPO increase. Additionally, we suggest that VCs having higher reputations further exacerbate this behavior.
This article contributes to agency theory by
providing insights on how self-interested intermediaries affect the IPO process. Agency costs associated
with IPO have traditionally focused on underwriters
and largely ignored self-interest seeking from the VC
firm. Our study provides insight into how the most
powerful VCs, those with substantial experience and
a strong reputation, enhance their returns through
increased underpricing and a shortened lockup. Our
results make a practical contribution to entrepreneurs pursuing relationships with VC firms and provide a conceptual contribution to the IPO literature
by highlighting the role that VCs play in underpricing decisions.

The IPO and Repeat Exchanges

Agency theory research has been used to examine
conflicts of interest that occur between investors in
mergers and acquisitions (Masulis & Nahata, 2009;
Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008) and, more recently, between parties involved in the analysis of VCs’ portfolio firms approaching IPO (Jenkinson & Jones,
2009). Studies have shown that conflicts of interest
do exist, but researchers have struggled to find direct
evidence that shows that the IPO valuation and allocations are a result of these conflicts of interest
(Reuter, 2006; Ritter & Zhang, 2007). As a result,
discussions of agency issues in the IPO process are
often focused more on the underwriter and incidences of underpricing than on the venture capital
firms involved in moving the portfolio firm toward
IPO.
In order to understand the impact that the intermediaries have on firms going through IPO, it is
important to understand why firms choose to go
through an IPO in the first place. There are a number of explanations to present as possible reasons
for such a decision. Many firms choose to go public
after recognizing the high-value market opportunities that exist. Successful entrepreneurial firms may
reach a point where it is possible to establish a competitive advantage through a favorable market-tobook ratio. When these advantages are recognized,
the likelihood of an IPO increases (Pagano & Panetta, 1998). As such, much of the decision making regarding whether to go through with an IPO is based
on the market and whether the IPO will create the
resources necessary to improve the firm’s competitive position, especially considering the additional
competitive pressures that issuing firms face from
12 New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
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incumbents in the market (Hsu, Reed, & Rocholl,
2010). Firms that have already established a competitive strategy and have achieved a sustainable performance are more likely to remain privately traded
(Hsu et al., 2010).
Following IPO, the issuing firm is recapitalized,
leading to a reduced debt-to-equity ratio, which increases the flexibility in the investments that the issuing firm is able to make. This suggests that firms
choose to go public in order to gain access to the
resources necessary for the IPO firm to respond
more effectively to the changes in the market (Hsu
et al., 2010). The IPO, by default, serves as a signal
of high quality (Stoughton, Wong, & Zechner, 2001)
and suggests that the issuing firm maintains greater
stores of knowledge capital that present an advantage over competitors (Cockburn & Griliches,
1988).
Venture capitalists provide valuable capabilities to
the firm during the IPO process, including the abilities necessary to manage venture growth efficiently,
define strategic advantages, and identify high-value
opportunities (Ivanov & Masulis, 2008). VCs also
maintain necessary ties with other influential intermediaries, including the underwriters that have a consistent presence in the IPO market.
The motivations of all parties involved in the
IPO are very similar. The new venture VC and the
underwriter want to appropriate the greatest amount
of value from the IPO process (He, Cordeiro, &
Shaw, 2015). However, the long-term outcomes vary
significantly for the parties involved. Repeat exchanges between the VC and the underwriter can
create a situation where the bargaining power shifts
to favor the VC and underwriter to the detriment of
the entrepreneur. Despite the belief that the development of relationships can resolve these issues, a
number of studies have shown a connection between misaligned incentives of equity underwriters
and excessive IPO underpricing (Baron, 1982;
Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003; Loughran & Ritter,
2004; Loughran & Ritter, 2002; Nimalendran, Ritter,
& Zhang, 2007; Reuter, 2006). Questions remain
concerning this high level of underpricing and efforts have been made to explain why this underpricing would be accepted by the issuing firm and the
VC firm that is backing the IPO.
We suggest that promised access to greater
wealth incentivizes the VC firm to accept greater
underpricing. Such agreements would suggest that
reciprocal relationships between the VC and the underwriter indicate that agency costs may actually increase when partnering with VCs and underwriters
that have an established long-term, trusted relationship. This perspective proposes that the lack of immediate trust between parties may actually benefit
2
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the issuing firm because it will allow the market to
assign firm value more accurately. Additionally,
when repeat exchanges are a characteristic of the
market, it is unlikely that breaches of conduct will
occur from the beginning of the relationship because
the loss of social capital would be too great (Molm,
Schaefer, & Collett, 2007).

Hypothesis Development

The repeat interactions that occur between VCs and
underwriters creates an environment that may increase agency costs to the entrepreneur. VCs have
power in the selection of underwriters for their portfolio firms and, as a result, have the potential to create repeat relationships with underwriters that maximize their wealth appropriation. This relationship is
further complicated by underwriters that are motivated to keep a strong relationship with venture capitalists in order to improve the likelihood that they
will be selected to act as underwriters on future ventures that the VC firm has invested in. This motivation to build and keep strong ties means that investments banks reciprocate the benefits provided by
the venture capital firm (Bradley et al., 2015). The
establishment of long-term relationships between
underwriters and venture capital firms can serve as
an additional method for affecting the IPO process.
This happens through two main channels.
First, relationships tend to reduce the information
asymmetries through access to potentially private information that allows underwriters to better assess
the quality of the VC’s portfolio firms as well as gain
a better understanding of the influence that the VC
has in the decision making of portfolio firms. For
instance, according to Baum and Silverman (2004), a
VCs involvement in the IPO can act as a signal of
quality when unambiguous measures of performance
from other sources do not exist. Underwriters that
have developed a lasting relationship with these VCs
are in a more advantageous position to receive these
signals and to capitalize on the information that is
presented. This is especially true when the information provided by the VC is relevant for the evaluation of other firms in the VC’s portfolio and is difficult for outsiders to gain access to.
Second, long-term relationships may impact the
prevalence of agency issues in the transaction. VCs
and underwriters have a long-term presence in the
IPO market and must maintain relationships in order
to gain access to new deals that can produce future
revenue. The long-term nature of the relationship and
the need to maintain strong moral capital would suggest that VCs would be more incentivized to provide
accurate information to underwriters and underwriters would be more inclined to provide a fair appraisal
of the offering.
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015

Due to the lockup restriction imposed on VCs,
wealth lost through underpricing is of less concern to
the VC than the value of the stock when the lockup
period expires. As a result, VCs are most interested
in decreasing the lockup period so that they can benefit from investments more quickly. We propose that
VCs agree to greater underpricing in exchange for
the immediate reciprocation of a shortened lockup.
Specifically, VC firms are desirous to capitalize on
their investment more quickly and can only do so
when the lockup expires (Bradley et al., 2015; 2011).
We propose that the exchange central to the reciprocal exchanges agreement is the VC firm’s acceptance
of greater underpricing in exchange for a shorter
lockup period.
Hypothesis 1: Greater underpricing will negatively
impact the length of the lockup period.
An underwriter has an incentive to please its
institutional investors by underpricing more so that
they will be loyal for future deals. Institutional investors can buy at the offer price and then flip the
shares for a profit at the end of the first trading day.
In this situation, the institutional investors are rewarded for their loyalty and the pre-IPO investors
receive much less capital from the offering (Arthurs,
Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008). Gains are
most pronounced when investors are involved in a
large offering that produces considerable financial
benefit. As a result, underwriters are very interested
in gaining access to high-value IPOs in order to
maintain strong relationships with institutional investors. In order to gain access to a sizeable offering, underwriters will reciprocate by agreeing to a
shorter lockup period. As a result, we argue that
VCs will receive a shorter lockup when providing
underwriters access to high-value IPOs. This is proposed in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The size of the offering will be negatively related to the lockup period.

VC Reputation

A characteristic of the relationship between the VC
and underwriter that has been largely ignored is the
influence that VCs have in their portfolio firm’s
choice of underwriter (Ince, 2011). We propose that
repeat interactions occur as a result of the VC’s influence and underwriters that desire access to a specific VC’s portfolio firms must offer incentives to
the VC in the short term, not just in the rent generated after market.
Underwriters benefit from relationships with
top venture capitalists because of the influence that
WHAT’S IN IT FOR ME? 13
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venture capitalists have on portfolio firms. The most
active, reputable VCs, akin to top underwriters, have
market power and underwriters maintain a strong
relationship with these VCs by agreeing to shorter
lockups. Importantly, these relationships are not defined by a single “deal” but persist over time. This
long-term relationship means that incentives may
actually occur at a future IPO rather than the current
IPO. As a result, underwriters are motivated to
maintain long-term relationships with highly reputable VCs in order to continue being selected as the
portfolio firm’s underwriter. We argue that more
reputable VCs will be consistently presented with a
shorter lockup period as a result of their influential
position over portfolio firms.
Hypothesis 3: The reputation of the VC firm will be
negatively related to the length of the lockup period.

Methodology
Sample

To test these hypotheses, we collected a random
sample of firms that went through an IPO between
1997 and 2007. We used the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Database to identify these
firms and gather supporting data. The SDC collects
data from publicly available sources including newspaper and wire sources, SEC filings, trade publications, and firm prospectuses. Additionally, we used
COMPUSTAT and CRSP to gather financial information. The final sample consisted of 236 U.S. IPO
firms in the 31 different industries.

Measures
Dependent variables. Benefits to the venture capital firm are measured using the agreed upon lockup
period. Lockup is defined as the agreement between
current shareholders and the underwriter that prevents current shareholders from selling their shares
of stock for a designated period of time following
the IPO (Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson,
2009). A single IPO firm may have different lockup
period agreements with its underwriter, meaning that
some shareholders face different restrictions from
other shareholders. To accommodate for these differences in the lockup agreement, lockup period was
calculated as a weighted average of the number of
days covered by the restricted selling period (Arthurs
et al., 2009). The formula is as follows:
(Lockup period1 x Shares in lockup1) + (Lockup period2 x Shares in lockup2)
(Shares in lockup1 + Shares in lockup2)

14 New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
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Constructing the variable in this fashion means
that when, for example, there are four VCs in the
syndicate and each has a different lockup, the lockup
is calculated according to the impact that the lockup
has. A VC with greater ownership and a shorter
lockup would weigh the formula differently from a
VC with less ownership and a shorter lockup. This
approach is more appropriate for understanding the
impact that lockup periods have on the firm and
whether these lockup periods are a result of reciprocal agreements.

Independent variables. Underpricing is calculated as
the price on the first day of trading minus the offer
price divided by the offer price (Logue, Rogalski,
Seward, & Foster‐Johnson, 2002). Underpricing is the
most prevalent measure of short-term IPO performance as it takes both the offer price and the stock
price into account, while combining “the diverse perspectives of nearly every stakeholder group associated
with the IPO context” (Certo et al., 2009, pp. 1363).
Size of Offering is calculated as the number of shares
issued during the initial public offering (Kennedy et
al., 2006; Nam, Park, & Arthurs, 2014). VC Reputation
was calculated using data available on Tim Pollock’s
personal website (www.timothypollock.com/
vc_reputation.htm).

Control variables. Following similar research, we

include several control variables in order to account
for alternative explanations (Certo, 2003). Firm Age
and Firm Size were controlled using years since
founding and the total employees of the firm at the
time of the IPO (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Park &
Patel, 2015). Risk was calculated as the total number
of risk factors listed in the prospectus (Beatty &
Zajac, 1994; Park & Patel, 2015). To control for the
effect of previous lockup agreements between the
underwriter and the VC, the average lockup was calculated by averaging the lockup length of each previous IPO that the underwriter and VC had worked
on together. Total History refers to the reciprocal relationship between the VC and the underwriter and
was calculated by examining the VC firm’s involvement in previous IPOs. Research suggests that reciprocal relationships can exist regardless of whether
the VC in question is the “lead” investor. Therefore,
the relationship was counted if the VC firm and underwriter were involved in an IPO together, regardless of what level of involvement the VC firm had.
Underwriter Reputation was coded using data available
on Jay Ritter’s personal website at the University of
Florida. This data is based on the methodology employed by Carter et al. (Carter & Manaster, 1990;
Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998) and subsequently compiled and updated by Jay Ritter.
4
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Mean

S.D.

1.

1. Lockup Days

215.49

135.26

1

2. Firm Age

48.92

225.24

-.015

1

3. Risk Factors

28.64

7.85

-.168**

.003

1

4. Firm Size

928.3

2186.64

-.103

-.15

-.18

1

5. Average Lockup

192.52

70.8

.051

-.014

-.01

.005

1

.84

1.46

-.127*

.055

.12

-.044

-.036

1

7. Size of Offering

42.22

33.66

-.323**

-.042

-.07

.592**

-.080

.042

1

8. Total History

10.93

3.36

-.173**

-.047

.01

-.037

-.020

.192**

.014

1

9. VC Reputation

.25

19.647

.037

.007

-.03

-.035

-.068

.104**

.002

.081

10. UW Reputation

7.04

.233

-.555**

.086

.04

.138*

-.054

.180** .419** .309** -.033

6. Underpricing

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

1
1

Notes: N = 236; * p<.05; **p<.01

Results

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and Table 2. Results of Regression Analysis Predicting
correlations of the key variables in the analysis. OLS
Lockup
regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
presented in the article. The presence of multicollinearity was examined by conducting a variance infla- Control Variables
tion factor analysis (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 2005;
-.015
-.008
-.022
-.031
Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). This examina- Firm Age
-.172**
-.169**
-.074
-.078
tion yielded no variables with scores higher than 10 Risk Factors
(the highest score was 3.999), indicating that there Firm Size
-.109
-.115
.103
.097
are no problems of multicollinearity. Additionally,
.050
.046
.017
.020
reports showed that skewness and kurtosis were Average Lockup
UW Reputation
-.101
-.98
-.110
.133*
within acceptable ranges.
Table 2 presents the results of the regression Total History
-1.023*
-.953*
-1.027*
-1.056
analysis. For simplification, we include only the key
variables in our analysis. Model 1 shows the baseline Independent Variables
-.127*
-1.04†
-.082
results of regressing lockup on the control variables. Underpricing
Model 2 to Model 4 represent the full models testing Size of Offering
-.361**
-.356**
Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 3.
-.489**
Using Model 2 to examine Hypothesis 1, we VC Reputation
.043
.059
.133
.159
found that the length of the lockup period is shorter R2
when the IPO firms face greater underpricing, sup- Adjusted R2
.026
.039
.110
.130
porting Hypothesis 1. This indicates support for the
2.596*
2.884*
5.862*
5.374**
belief that reciprocal exchanges exist between ven- F-Statistics
2
.043
.016
.074
.005
ture capitalists and underwriters. Hypothesis 2 sug- Change R
gests that the size of the offering will be negatively F-Statistics for Change
2.596*
3.906* 19.583**
1.289
related to lockup. Overall, offering size had a significant negative effect on lockup period, providing Notes:
support for Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 was also †* p<.10
p<.05
supported, indicating that highly reputable VCs will ** p<.01
be able to gain access to a shorter lockup period.
This suggests that the value of the VC firm’s portfolio firms has an impact on the behaviors and decisions that underwriters make.
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015
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Discussion and Conclusion

Taken together, the results provide strong evidence
that reciprocal exchanges are part of the interactions
between VCs and underwriters. However, the longterm relationships that develop between underwriters and VCs appear to have exchanges that benefit
the underwriter more than the VC. The results suggest that while VCs maintain access to their portfolio
firms and that even highly reputable underwriters
will offer incentives in the form of shorter lockups
to gain access to the portfolio firms, these incentives
change once the relationship has been established.
Our inquiry provides a contribution to the literature on information asymmetry as it relates to underpricing and also provides an understanding of the
reciprocal exchanges between underwriters and VCs
that impact the valuation of issuing firms. By examining the relationship history between the underwriter
and the VC, we offer clear evidence to suggest that
the establishment of trust may not provide the anticipated benefits to the issuing firm. Given the mediated nature of the IPO market, knowing the characteristics and background of the influential parties can be
useful when seeking to maximize the long-term
wealth of pre-IPO investors.
Overall, the results suggest that the VC’s influence over portfolio firms creates a position of power
that may not be long lasting. The establishment of
reciprocal exchanges occurs as a result of the selfserving desires of the underwriter and the VC, but
reputable underwriters are able to reclaim the power
once the relationship has been established. It may be
that underwriters that gain access to portfolio firms
through the influence of the VC are able to present
different incentives other than a shorter lockup period. Regardless of the long-term benefits, the exchanges characterized by immediate reciprocation
end after reputable underwriters develop a relationship with the VC.
These results provide an interesting perspective
on the power dynamics of the parties involved in the
IPO process. These reciprocal exchanges indicate
that IPOs exist in a double-mediated market and
future exchanges are heavily influenced by the selfserving desires of the underwriter and VC. It is also
interesting to note that these findings describe a

more subtle approach to market manipulation than
has been recognized in the past. For example, in the
late 1990s underwriters engaged in more overt tactics of market manipulation and were punished. In
that situation, underwriters gave VCs buy-in to attractive IPOs as reciprocal exchanges for future IPOs (Smith, Grimes, Zuckerman, & Scannell, 2002).
They also engaged in laddering activities wherein
they required their institutional investors to purchase
additional shares in the aftermarket to drive up the
price of the shares in the focal IPO (after the shares
were offered at a low price to start with) (Choi &
Pritchard, 2004; Smith & Craig, 2004). Though these
types of tactics have been resolved, it seems that underwriters and VCs are still behaving opportunistically but are simply doing a better job of covering
their actions.
Limitations of this study point to several possible future research directions. First, the referenced
time frame does not include many years that are
characterized by high volatility. This suggests that
our findings may have somewhat limited generalizability during incidents of economic turmoil. It would
be interesting to further theorize and provide empirical evidence on whether agency costs increase during greater economic uncertainty. Second, we did
not examine the impact that shorter lockup agreements have on the investment syndicate. Future
work could determine whether VC syndicates receive equal benefits from these reciprocal exchanges
or if the benefits are closely tied to ownership and
relationship history. This level of nuance wasn’t
achieved in this study and would be an interesting
extension for future research.
Finally, future research could examine precisely
when the power dynamics of the relationship between the VC and the underwriter begin to change.
By identifying the ideal relationship history, we
would be better able to determine when the benefits
from working with a trusted partner are eroded by
opportunistic behavior. Future works such as these
would be beneficial for understanding the nuanced
exchanges among parties in the IPO process and
would substantively contribute to both the entrepreneurship and new venture financing literature.

References

Arthurs, J., Hoskisson, R., Busenitz, L., & Johnson, R. (2008). Managerial agents watching other agents: multiple agency conflicts regarding underpricing in IPO firms. The Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), 51(2), 277–294.
Arthurs, J. D., Busenitz, L. W., Hoskisson, R. E., & Johnson, R. A. (2009). Signaling and initial public offerings: The use and impact of
the lockup period. Journal of Business Venturing, 24(4), 360–372.
Baron, D. P. (1982). A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues. The Journal of
Finance, 37(4), 955–976.
16 New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol18/iss2/2

6

Miller et al.: What’s in It for Me? Reciprocal Exchanges
Baum, J. A. C., & Silverman, B. S. (2004). Picking winners or building them? Alliance, intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria
in venture financing and performance of biotechnology startups. Journal of Business Venturing, 19(3), 411–436.
Beatty, R. P., & Zajac, E. J. (1994). Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(2), 313–335.
Belsley, D. A., Kuh, E., & Welsch, R. E. (2005). Regression diagnostics: Identifying influential data and sources of collinearity (Vol. 571): WileyInterscience.
Bradley, D., Kim, I., & Krigman, L. (2015). Top VC IPO underpricing. Journal of Corporate Finance, 31, 186–202.
Bradley, D. J., Kim, I., & Krigman, L. (2011). Currying favor with top venture capital firms: The role of IPO underpricing and all-star coverage. Paper
presented at the Paris December 2012 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI Paper.
Carter, R., & Manaster, S. (1990). Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation. Journal of Finance, 45(4), 1045–1067.
Carter, R. B., Dark, F. H., & Singh, A. K. (1998). Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO
Stocks. The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 285–311.
Certo, S. T. (2003). Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: Signaling with Board Structures. The Academy of Management
Review, 28(3), 432–446.
Certo, S. Trevis., Holcomb, Tim R., Holmes, R. Michael. (2009). IPO Research in Management and Entrepreneurship: Moving the Agenda
Forward. Journal of Management, 35(6), 1340-1378.
Choi, S., & Pritchard, A. C. (2004). Should issuers be on the hook for laddering? An empirical analysis of the IPO market manipulation
litigation.
Cockburn, I., & Griliches, Z. (1988). The Estimation and Measurement of Spillover Effects of R&D Investment-Industry Effects and Appropriability
Measures in the Stock Market's Valuation of R&D and Patents. Paper presented at the American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings.
He, L., Cordeiro, J. J., & Shaw, T. S. (2015). CEO power, equity ownership and underwriter reputation as determinants of lockup period
length. Management Research Review, 38(5), 438–458.
Hsu, H.-C., Reed, A. V., & Rocholl, J. (2010). The New Game in Town: Competitive Effects of IPOs. Journal of Finance, 65(2), 495–528.
Ince, O. (2011). Double Intermediation in IPOs: Double the Trouble? Available at SSRN 1787401.
Ivanov, V., & Masulis, R. (2008). Strategic alliances and corporate governance in newly public firms: Evidence from corporate venture capital.
Jenkinson, T., & Jones, H. (2009). IPO Pricing and Allocation: A Survey of the Views of Institutional Investors. The Review of Financial
Studies, 22(4), 1477–1504.
Jindra, J., & Leshchinskii, D. (2015). Venture Capital Valuation, Partial Adjustment, and Underpricing: Behavioral Bias or Information
Production? Financial Review, 50(2), 173–219.
Kennedy, D. B., Sivakumar, R., & Vetzal, K. R. (2006). The implications of IPO underpricing for the firm and insiders: Tests of asymmetric information theories. Journal of Empirical Finance, 13(1), 49-–78.
Lee, P. M., & Wahal, S. (2004). Grandstanding, certification and the underpricing of venture capital backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), 375–407.
Liu, K., Arthurs, J. D., Nam, D., & Mousa, F.-T. (2013). Information diffusion and value redistribution among transaction partners of
the IPO firm. Strategic management journal.
Ljungqvist, A., & Wilhelm, W. J., Jr. (2003). IPO Pricing in the Dot-Com Bubble. The Journal of Finance, 58(2), 723 -752.
Logue, Dennis E., Rogalski, Richard J., Seward, James K., & Foster‐Johnson, L. (2002). What Is Special about the Roles of Underwriter
Reputation and Market Activities in Initial Public Offerings? The Journal of Business, 75(2), 213–243.
Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. (2004). Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time? Financial Management (Blackwell Publishing Limited), 33
(3), 5–37.
Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. (2002). Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs? Review of Financial Studies,
15(2), 413–444.
Masulis, R. W., & Nahata, R. (2009). Financial contracting with strategic investors: Evidence from corporate venture capital backed IPOs.
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18(4), 599–631.
Matvos, G., & Ostrovsky, M. (2008). Cross-ownership, returns, and voting in mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 89(3), 391–403.
Molm, L. D., Schaefer, D. R., & Collett, J. L. (2007). The Value of Reciprocity. Social Psychology Quarterly, 70(2), 199–217.
Nahata, R. (2008). Venture capital reputation and investment performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2), 127–151.
Nam, D.-i., Park, H. D., & Arthurs, J. D. (2014). Looking Attractive until You Sell: Earnings Management, Lockup Expiration, and Venture Capitalists. Journal of Management Studies, 51(8), 1286–1310.

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015

WHAT’S IN IT FOR ME? 17

7

New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 18 [2015], No. 2, Art. 2
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1985). Applied linear statistical models: Regression, analysis of variance, and experimental
designs. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin: Inc.
Nimalendran, M., Ritter, J. R., & Zhang, D. (2007). Do today’s trades affect tomorrow’s IPO allocations? Journal of Financial Economics, 84
(1), 87–109.
Pagano, M., & Panetta, F. (1998). Why do companies go public? An empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 27–64.
Park, H. D., & Patel, P. C. (2015). How Does Ambiguity Influence IPO Underpricing? The Role of the Signalling Environment. Journal of
Management Studies.
Reuter, J. (2006). Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds. The Journal of Finance, 61(5), 2289–2324.
Ritter, J. R., & Welch, I. (2002). A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations. The Journal of Finance, 57(4), 1795–1828.
Ritter, J. R., & Zhang, D. (2007). Affiliated mutual funds and the allocation of initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2),
337–368.
Smith, R., & Craig, S. (2004). Auction promises to bid adieu to tradition. Wall Street Journal.
Smith, R., Grimes, A., Zuckerman, G., & Scannell, K. (2002). Something Ventured and Something Gained? Wall Street Journal.
Stoughton, N. M., Wong, K. P., & Zechner, J. (2001). IPOs and Product Quality. The Journal of Business, 74(3), 375–408.

About the Authors
DOUGLAS R. MILLER (millerdr@uncw.edu) is an Assistant Professor of Management at Virginia Commonwealth University. His research areas include firm innovation and new venture founder commitment. His work has been published in the Journal of Product Innovation Management and Strategic Management
Journal. He earned a PhD from Washington State University.
TERA L. GALLOWAY (lgallo@ilstu.edu) is an Assistant Professor in Strategic Management at Illinois
State University. Since earning her PhD from Washington State University, she has published in several
outlets including Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice and presented at national and international conferences. Her research interests include alliances, advice networks, coopetition, and legitimacy repair.
DUSTIN B. SMITH (millerdr@uncw.edu) is an Assistant Professor of Management and Corporate Responsibility at Webster University. His work focuses on social issues in management including reputation repair and recovery, stakeholder reactions to social initiatives, and antecedents to corporate social
performance. Dr. Smith received his PhD from Washington State University.

18 New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol18/iss2/2

8

